Wednesday, 18 November 2026

State of the Nation 2026: The Kenyan Diaspora

Open Letter · State of the Nation 2026

Mr President, What About the Kenyan Diaspora?

Four Fundamental Questions After Your State of the Nation Address

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President William Ruto delivering the 2026 State of the Nation Address to Parliament
President William Ruto delivers his fourth State of the Nation Address, Nairobi, 18 November 2026.

President William Samoei Ruto, I listened to your State of the Nation Address today, 18 November 2026, with considerable interest.

There was much about economic recovery, employment, infrastructure and affordable housing. You also told Parliament that 707,000 Kenyans have secured jobs abroad through international labour mobility, supporting their families and contributing to the economy through remittances.

But the Kenyan diaspora deserved considerably more than a passing sentence.

Let me begin by giving credit where it is due. Under your administration, diaspora remittances have grown substantially. According to the Central Bank of Kenya, annual inflows rose from US$4.03 billion in 2022 to a record US$5.04 billion in 2025, an increase of roughly 25%.

Not all of that growth can be attributed to your administration. Many Kenyans were living, working and remitting money long before you assumed office. Nevertheless, your government's deliberate pursuit of international labour mobility, including the bilateral partnership with Germany and the Kazi Majuu initiative, deserves acknowledgement.

But I have four fundamental questions.

I.Remittances, the Shilling and What Becomes of the Money

To grasp what US$5 billion means, set it against your own budget. In 2025, Kenyans abroad sent home roughly KSh650 billion.

In the National Treasury's FY2026/27 Budget Summary, Defence was allocated KSh250.0 billion, roads KSh230.3 billion and the health sector KSh170.7 billion. Together, these amount to KSh651.0 billion. For perspective, the roughly KSh650 billion that Kenyans abroad remitted in 2025 was almost exactly equivalent to the combined allocations for Defence, roads and health.

One year of remittances, set against the budget

Defence (2026/27)KSh250.0 bn
Roads (2026/27)KSh230.3 bn
Health sector (2026/27)KSh170.7 bn
CombinedKSh651.0 bn
Diaspora remittances (calendar 2025)≈ KSh650 bn

Remittances are private household transfers, not government revenue. The comparison illustrates scale only. Allocations: National Treasury, FY2026/27 Budget Summary.

The comparisons do not stop there. That sum exceeds the entire national security allocation of KSh566.9 billion. It is one and a half times the KSh424.3 billion allocated to the Teachers Service Commission. It is ten times the KSh63.0 billion set aside for agriculture, the sector on which most of our families at home depend.

These are not government revenues. They are private transfers that pay school fees, settle hospital bills and buy seed and fertiliser. Household by household, the diaspora mobilises resources on a scale comparable to major components of the national budget, without those transfers themselves constituting public revenue.

That family support is economically valuable in its own right. Education, healthcare and nutrition are themselves investments in human capital. But it raises a question I put to an audience in Berlin in May 2025. Speaking at re:publica on “From Black Tax to Business Capital: Transforming African Diaspora Remittances”, I argued that Africa must move beyond celebrating the volume of its remittances. By widely cited estimates, remittances to the continent approach US$100 billion a year and now rival official development assistance. Yet much of that money, of necessity, meets immediate household needs rather than building lasting enterprises.

Watch: “From Black Tax to Business Capital: Transforming African Diaspora Remittances”, re:publica 2025, Berlin. Open on YouTube

Kenya's own data reinforce that concern. The 2025 Remittances Household Survey by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and the Central Bank found that 73% of respondents directed cash remittances to food and household goods. While 82.5% of recipients owned mobile money accounts, only 6.5% held securities and 5.4% held microfinance accounts. Financial inclusion has expanded, but the pathways from remittances to productive investment remain insufficiently developed.

The answer is not to diminish family support. It is to open additional pathways: business creation, diaspora impact investment and crowdfunding, the transfer of knowledge and technology, and local ownership that creates sustainable employment. Programmes such as WIDU.africa, which pairs diaspora investment with German development grants and business coaching, show what structured support can achieve. My own Kipkenda Poultry in Nandi County, a solar-powered farm with its own feed processing, is my attempt to put that principle into practice.

So, Mr President: Kenya receives about US$5 billion a year from its diaspora. How much of that capital reaches productive enterprises? What deliberate mechanisms has your administration established to convert remittance flows into investment, enterprise, technology transfer and jobs? And how will the government leverage diaspora capital without confusing private household transfers with public development finance?

The question is no longer how much the diaspora sends home, but how much lasting economic value we create from what we send.

And the flows themselves are under strain. In the twelve months to October 2026, inflows fell 1.1% to US$5.023 billion. In October alone, remittances from the United States fell 28.1% year on year. The Central Bank has cut its full-year projection. The latest twelve-month figures point to a reversal in remittance growth, raising the possibility of an annual contraction in 2026. An address that celebrated labour export should have confronted that risk.

The shilling has remained remarkably stable at about KSh129.8 to the US dollar. How much of that stability can reasonably be attributed to diaspora inflows, as opposed to monetary policy, foreign exchange reserves, external borrowing, import demand and other factors?

More importantly, what has this stability meant for ordinary Kenyan households, businesses, importers and exporters? Are we merely celebrating the volume of foreign currency entering Kenya? Or can we show how it translates into productive investment, employment and improved living standards? And now that the flows are falling, what is the plan?

II.Diaspora Voter Registration: When, and With What Money?

Mr President, the 2027 General Election is approaching. When will Kenyans living abroad have a clear, accessible and adequately publicised voter registration timetable?

We contribute to Kenya's economy, support our families, invest in businesses, finance community projects and remain deeply engaged in our country's development. Yet our electoral participation remains unnecessarily difficult.

The IEBC has announced that diaspora registration will expand from 12 to 26 countries. That is welcome. But the Commission has told Parliament plainly that it lacks the money. It needs about KSh502 million for diaspora mapping, registration and voting, yet has been allocated KSh400 million. As a result, no mapping or registration took place in the last financial year.

The IEBC is constitutionally independent, and it is the Commission that must provide the operational answers. Funding, however, is not the Commission's to decide: the Executive proposes the budget and Parliament appropriates it. A shortfall of about KSh102 million is about 0.02% of what the diaspora sends home in a single year: what Kenyans abroad send home in under two hours.

So my question is direct. Will the Executive propose, and Parliament appropriate, the additional funds the IEBC has requested? And when shall we see a credible, funded and publicly communicated diaspora voter registration programme?

III.Why Must We Travel to Berlin to Vote?

For those of us living in Germany, the requirement to travel to the Kenyan Embassy in Berlin is a substantial practical barrier. Germany is a large country. A Kenyan living in Bavaria, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia or Baden-Württemberg should not have to make an expensive, time-consuming journey simply to exercise a constitutional right.

Germany already qualifies. Regulation 34(2) of the Elections (Registration of Voters) Regulations ties diaspora voter registration, and in practice voting, to countries where Kenya maintains an embassy, high commission or consulate, and Kenya has an embassy in Berlin. But which country may host diaspora voting is one question. Where registration and polling centres are designated within that country is another.

What precisely prevents the IEBC from designating additional registration and polling centres within Germany? Is the obstacle legal, financial, logistical or administrative? The IEBC has itself warned that Regulation 34 unduly limits the constitutional right to vote and asked for it to be amended. Will your government support that reform?

The Commission also plans mobile registration centres in cities with large Kenyan populations in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and South Africa. Germany is not on that list. Yet the 2025 Remittances Household Survey by the Central Bank and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics ranks Germany second only to the United States as a source of household remittance inflows. Why are mobile centres planned for London and Johannesburg, but not for Hamburg, Frankfurt, Munich or Düsseldorf? A remittance ranking is not a voter count, but it is a signal. What assessment has the IEBC made of the number and distribution of eligible Kenyan voters in Germany, and how has that assessment informed its choice of registration and polling centres?

Kenya already has an honorary consul in the Hamburg area whose district covers Hamburg, Bremen, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Honorary consular status does not by itself authorise an office to register voters. That is precisely why the IEBC should say what would: could that office, or premises like it, be designated as a registration point for northern Germany before August 2027?

Expanding diaspora voting to more countries is welcome. But adding countries without improving access within them is only part of the solution.

IV.Affordable Housing: Why Are Diaspora Applications Left ‘Unapproved’?

Your administration has made affordable housing one of its flagship programmes. The Boma Yangu platform specifically invites Kenyans in the diaspora to apply.

Yet my own application has now sat marked ‘unapproved’ for three weeks, with no explanation and no indication of what happens next. I am not alone: many other Kenyans abroad have told me the same.

Does ‘unapproved’ mean an application has been rejected, or simply that it has not yet been processed? These are fundamentally different administrative outcomes, and applicants deserve to know which applies to them.

If it is pending, is it an identity verification problem, an eligibility issue, an administrative backlog or something else? How many diaspora applications have been received, and how many approved, rejected or left pending? What are the average processing times? And when will applicants receive transparent decisions, reasons for rejection and an effective appeals mechanism? Does Boma Yangu publish a service standard stating how long verification and approval of a diaspora application should take?

Recall the scale. Last year's remittances exceeded the entire national security allocation. It is difficult to ask Kenyans abroad to invest in housing at home while leaving them uncertain about the status of their own applications.

Mr President, the Diaspora Is More Than Remittances

We are not merely a source of foreign exchange or an overseas labour market. We are Kenyan citizens.

We are entrepreneurs, scientists, professionals, investors, employers, parents, farmers and community development partners. We transfer knowledge, build businesses, create jobs, support schools and hospitals, and mobilise resources for communities that government programmes do not always reach.

Last year we sent home the equivalent of the Defence, roads and health allocations combined. That is not why we are entitled to vote: that right is ours because we are Kenyan citizens. Yet even when we succeed in registering, we may vote only in the presidential election, and only where the IEBC has designated a centre.

We recognise progress where it has occurred, and we give credit where it is due. But recognition must be reciprocal. A government that actively seeks the economic contributions of its citizens abroad must be equally committed to facilitating their constitutional rights and their access to public services.

If our money is welcome in Kenya, our democratic participation and access to public services must be equally welcome.

The Kenyan diaspora deserves more than recognition in remittance statistics. We deserve an effective place in the national development agenda.

About the Author

Dr. rer. nat. habil. Dr. Seronei Chelulei Cheison is a food scientist, biotech entrepreneur and farmer. He grew up as a herdsboy in Nandi County, and his academic path took him through Egerton University, Jiangnan University in China, where he earned his first doctorate, and the Technical University of Munich. He holds two doctorates and a German habilitation. Today he lives and works in Langwedel, Lower Saxony, Germany, where he is Founder and CEO of Sinonin Biotech GmbH, developing alternative proteins for petfood.

In Kenya he runs Sinonin Tea and Kipkenda Poultry in Nandi County, a farm powered entirely by solar energy. Through WIDU.africa, the German development programme that matches diaspora investment with grants, he has helped some 60 Kenyan enterprises secure about KSh35 million in support, 45 of them in Nandi County. He serves on the WIDU.africa advisory board.

He spoke at re:publica 2025 in Berlin on turning diaspora remittances into business capital, and received special recognition at the inaugural Jamhuri Diaspora Awards in Nairobi in December 2024. He is the author of Heritage of the Nandi.

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Sources

  1. National Treasury, Budget Summary for the FY 2026/27 Budget.
  2. The Star, Ruto: 707,000 Kenyans have secured jobs via Kazi Majuu, 18 November 2026.
  3. Business Daily, Diaspora remittances record softest growth in 15 years (CBK 2025 total).
  4. Daily Nation, Kenya's diaspora remittances fall Sh9bn amid global economic shocks.
  5. The Kenya Times, Kenyans abroad send home less money as remittances decline, 14 November 2026.
  6. Rio Times, US remittances to Kenya fall 28% in October, 14 November 2026.
  7. The Standard, Live blog: Budget 2026/27, 11 June 2026.
  8. Capital FM, Kenya allocates Sh567bn to security in 2026/27 budget, 11 June 2026.
  9. Kenyans.co.ke, Kenyan shilling holds at Ksh129.81.
  10. Capital FM via AllAfrica, IEBC targets 28.5 million voters, doubles diaspora voting countries, 20 August 2026.
  11. People Daily, IEBC seeks Ksh502M funding to expand diaspora voting.
  12. Daily Nation, The diaspora vote factor: IEBC targets 26 countries.
  13. Dawan Africa, IEBC expands diaspora voting to 16 more countries.
  14. Xinhua via The Star (Malaysia), Kenya's remittances hit 7.2 bln USD (CBK/KNBS Remittances Household Survey 2025).
  15. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Central Bank of Kenya and FSD Kenya, 2025 Remittances Household Survey (KeNADA catalogue entry), published June 2026.
  16. Auswärtiges Amt, Vertretungen Kenias in Deutschland.

#KenyanDiaspora · #StateOfTheNation2026 · #DiasporaVoting · #KaziMajuu · #AffordableHousing · #Kenya2027

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State of the Nation 2026: The Kenyan Diaspora

Open Letter · State of the Nation 2026 Mr President, What About the Kenyan Diaspora? Four Fundamental Questions After Your State of th...